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The optimal choice of commuting speed: consequences for commuting 
time, distance and costs 
 
Abstract. In this paper, we derive a structural model for commuting speed. We presume 
that commuting speed is chosen to minimise commuting costs, which encompass both 
monetary and time costs. At faster speed levels, the monetary costs increase, but the time 
costs fall. Using data from Great Britain, we demonstrate that the income elasticity of 
commuting speed is 0.126. The ratio of variable monetary costs to travel time costs is 
0.14.  
 
Keywords: commuting, speed, travel demand modelling. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Since the pioneering work of McFadden (1974), a large number of studies on the choice 
of travel mode have been carried out. It may be argued that speed and monetary costs are 
the most important structural components of the travel mode choice, although other 
components (convenience etc) certainly have an influence. In the current paper, the focus 
is on commuting speed and its relation to the monetary costs. One of the main findings of 
the travel mode literature is that income is among the most important variables 
determining mode choice (Train, 1980; Kitamura, 1989; Jara Diaz and Videla, 1989; 
Dargay and Hanly, 2004), suggesting that low-income travellers choose a lower speed 
level to economise on monetary costs.1 This finding supports the literature on the trends 
in commuting distance, time and speeds travelled, which essentially demonstrates that 
average commuting time is (quite) constant over long periods, but commuting distance 
and speed have increased substantially over the last couple of decades during which we 
                                                          
1 The effect of income on mode choice is thought to be primarily indirect, through its effect on car 
ownership: higher income increases the probability of owning one or more cars and car availability is an 
important determinant of mode choice. In essence, high-income individuals choose faster, but more 
expensive travel modes than low-income individuals. Further, there is sufficient evidence that given the 
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have observed strong GDP growths. Clearly, the optimally chosen speed level is related 
to the concept of the value of time (VOT), which essentially measures the value of each 
unit of time that can be saved by travelling faster. So, given information on how the 
monetary costs of commuting depend on the speed level (e.g. Rouwendal, 1996), the 
value of time can be used to predict the chosen speed level.   
In the current paper, we identify the relationship between monetary costs and 
speed level given reduced form estimates of the income elasticity of the speed level. The 
theoretical analysis demonstrates that given an income elasticity of 0.5, the monetary 
costs are a linear function of speed, but for lower elasticities, the monetary costs are a 
convex function of speed. When the income elasticity is (close to) zero, then the 
commuter is essentially restricted in the choice of the optimal speed level. We also 
demonstrate that the ratio of the variable monetary costs to time travel costs, which is 
optimally chosen by the commuter by choosing the optimal speed, depends on how the 
monetary costs vary with speed. It appears that this ratio depends negatively on the 
marginal monetary costs of speed. Further, it appears that when the monetary costs are a 
linear function of speed, the variable monetary costs are exactly equal to the travel time 
costs when the speed is optimally chosen. In contrast, when the monetary costs are a 
convex (concave) function of speed, the variable monetary costs are less (more) than the 
time travel costs. We demonstrate on the basis of British data that the income elasticity of 
speed is 0.126, implying that the monetary costs are a convex function of speed, and that 
the variable monetary costs are less than the time travel costs. We find that the ratio of 
monetary costs to time travel costs is about 0.14 (with a standard error of 0.06). 
We emphasise that our analysis focuses on commuters and not on travellers in 
general for a number of reasons. First, value of time estimates vary widely among 
different travel purposes (Small, 1992). Commuters are a relatively homogeneous group 
of travellers for which assumptions on the value of time make more sense. Second, in the 
case of commuting, the commuting distance can be instrumented avoiding problems with 
the endogeneity of distance to speed, whereas this may be more difficult for other travel 
purposes. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
choice of travel mode, those with high incomes travel faster (Rienstra and Rietveld, 1996; Shinar et al. 
2001; Fosgerau, 2004). 
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The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we derive a structural 
model for speed and show how one can estimate and identify the parameters of interest 
based on reduced form estimates. In Section 3, the empirical results are presented and in 
Section 4 the interpretation of the estimates in terms of the structural model are 
discussed. Section 5 concludes.  
 
2. The optimal speed model 
 
In the current paper, we focus on employed individuals who earn an hourly wage w and 
who aim to minimise the commuting costs, conditional on the commuting distance. 
Workers' commuting costs t are generally thought to consist of two main components - 
monetary commuting costs tm and travel time costs tc. Workers can influence both 
commuting costs components by choosing the desired travel speed s. So, the commuting 
costs are determined by the travel speed s conditional on the commuting distance d. The 
choice of the travel speed determines the monetary and travel time costs. Commuting 
time is denoted as hc, which measures the hours of commuting. Note that the commuting 
costs include a fixed component, which does not depend on the chosen speed level.2 
Because the size of this component does not influence the chosen level of the speed, we 
will only focus on variable commuting costs. 
We assume that the monetary costs tm depend positively on the travel speed, 
spatial characteristics3, X and distance d.4 The hourly time travel costs are assumed to be 
proportional to the hourly wage w, so tc = ψwhc , where ψ > 0 and ψw is the value of 
                                                          
2 The fixed component can be defined as the minimum monetary costs to travel a certain distance using any 
travel mode within the choice set. For longer distances the choice set does not include walking and 
bicycling. Clearly, the fixed component is increasing in distance.  
3 We assume that monetary costs do not depend on the socio-demographic characteristics of the individual 
or on income. This, however, may not always be valid. One example of the former could be that 
maintenance costs may be lower for men than for women as they men are typically more likely to 
undertake car repairs themselves. An example of the dependency on income could be that higher income 
individuals have newer and more expensive cars for their reliability, comfort and status, rather than (or in 
addition to) their speed.  
4 It may be thought that given the choice of mode, the monetary costs are given. This is certainly not the 
case for car drivers. In the case of car drivers, the monetary costs include fuel costs, accident costs and 
fines which all depend on the speed level (Rienstra and Rietveld, 1996; Verhoef and Rouwendal, 2001; 
Gander, 1985; Rotemberg, 1985). Further, more expensive cars offer the opportunity to drive faster, see 
Rienstra and Rietveld (1996). Note further that we may ignore the situation where the commuting costs 
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time. It may be the case that ψ is a function of individual characteristics Z (but not of 
spatial characteristics), so ψ = ψ(Z). Given these assumptions, total variable commuting 
costs t can be written as: 
 
ddsXwhZt c ),,()( τψ += , (1) 
 
where τ(X,s,d) denotes the monetary costs divided by the distance, so τ(X,s,d) = tm/d. It is 
assumed that τ(X,s,d) is a continuous function of speed s.5  
Given the relationship between commuting time, speed and distance (by 
definition, commuting time hc equals d/s), total commuting costs can be written as: 
 
,)],,()([ ddsX
s
wZt τψ +=   (2) 
 
where the first term between brackets denotes the travel time costs per distance unit and 
the second term denotes the monetary costs per distance unit. Figure 1 illustrates 
commuting costs as a function of the chosen speed. Conditional on the commuting 
distance and the wage, the employee chooses the optimal speed s* by minimising total 
commuting costs. The first-order condition (∂t/∂s* = 0) implies then that: 
 
**
* ),,()( sdsXs
wZ τψ ′= , (3)
 
where τ'(X,s*,d) denotes ∂τ(X,s,d)/∂s for s = s*. Hence, in the optimum, the time costs tc  
are equal to τ'(X,s*,d)s*d. Hence, tm/tc = τ(X,s*,d)/τ'(X,s*,d)s*.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
depend negatively on speed, because this would imply that the maximum possible speed would always be 
chosen. 
5 The standard way to study modal choice is to apply discrete choice methods. As one proceeds from one 
mode to the other (for example from bicycle to bus), a discrete jump takes place in terms of both speed and 
monetary costs. In the present context we model these costs as a continuous function of speed. The 
assumption that τ(X,s,d) is continuous may be less restrictive than often thought, because many commuters 
combine several modes on a day (e.g. walking and underground) or use a combination of modes on several 
days during a week (Van Exel and Rietveld, 2004). Further, it may be argued that car drivers influence the 
speed level by changing departure time to and from work, so the monetary costs include the schedule delay 
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We will assume now that τ(X,s,d) = κ(X,d) ssα , hence τ(X,s,d) is parameterised as 
a power function of s (αs > 0; κ(X,d) > 0)6, so τ(X,s,d) is assumed to be increasing in the 
speed level and we allow for interactive effects between the speed level s, X and d. The 
parameter αs may be interpreted as the speed elasticity of the monetary costs (per 
distance). This interactive effect may exist, for example, because at long distances, the 
marginal monetary costs with respect to speed may be less than at short distances. 
Subsequently, it appears that: 
 
sc
m
t
t
α
1=    , if s = s*. (4) 
 
Hence given the optimal speed level, the ratio of the (variable) monetary costs to the time 
costs is equal to the inverse of the speed elasticity of the monetary costs. Note that this 
ratio does not depend on any other variable such as the speed level or the wage, because 
the speed level and therefore this ratio are optimally chosen. 
In the special case that the monetary costs are a linear function of the speed level, 
then αs = 1. This implies that in this special case tm = tc, so the optimal speed is chosen 
such that the time travel costs are exactly equal to the variable monetary travel costs, see 
Figure 1. Now suppose that the monetary costs are a convex (concave) function of speed, 
conditional on distance, so αs > 1 (αs < 1). In this case, the variable monetary costs 
exceed (less than) the time costs. In the current paper, we will estimate αs, which enables 
us to estimate the ratio of monetary costs to time costs. 
Given (3), the optimally chosen speed level can be written as: 
  
),,(/).(),,,( ** dsXwZwdXZs τψ ′= . (5)  
 
It follows from (5) that: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
costs. 
6 The assumption that αs exceeds zero guarantees that the second-order condition of the worker's 
minimisation problem is fulfilled in the optimum, which guarantees a finite speed solution. 
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2** ),,,(/).(),,( wdXZswZdsX ψτ =′ . (6)  
  
More conveniently, the (natural) logarithm of the optimal speed log s*(Z,X,d,w) can be 
written as: 
 
),,(loglog)(log),,,(log *2
1
2
1
2
1* dsXwZwdXZs τψ ′−+= . (7) 
Recall that τ(X,s,d) = κ(X,d) ssα . To derive how the optimally chosen speed depends on 
Z, X, d and w, we proceed by presuming a certain functional form for κ(X,d). We 
emphasise here that τ(X,s,d) is defined for arbitrary levels of s. We will suppose that: 
 
dX dxssdsX log0exp),,( αααατ ++=  (8) 
 
Hence, logτ(X,s,d) = αslogs+α0+αxX+αdlogd, so the parameter αd is the distance 
elasticity of the monetary costs per distance, so αd+1 is the distance elasticity of the 
monetary costs.7 Equation (8) implies that: 
 
sdxs dXsdsX ααααατ loglog1 0exp),,( +++−=′ .  (9) 
 
Let us further assume that: 
 
 Zz zZ
.
0 exp)(
ααψ = ,  (9B) 
 
where αz0 denotes a constant. To simplify the notation, we will write s*(Z,X,d,w) as s*. 
                                                          
7 It may be thought that αd must exceed –1, because the total monetary costs must be an increasing function 
of distance d.  However, αd may be less than –1, because total monetary costs consist of a fixed component, 
which does not depend on speed, and a variable component. In case that the fixed monetary costs increase 
as a function of distance, then the variable monetary costs may decrease in distance, so αs may be less than 
–1. 
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Substituting (9) and (9B) into (7), the optimally chosen speed level s* can then be written 
as:8 
 
s
sdxzz dXwZs α
αααααα
+
−−−+−+=
1
]logloglog[log
log 00* . (10) 
 
One of the main implications of (10) is that the optimal speed depends positively on the 
wage (since αs > 0). In order to estimate the structural parameters of (10), we also 
introduce unobserved heterogeneity. It is natural to assume that individuals deviate from 
each other in unobserved ways not taken into account by equation (10). We presume that 
α0 in (10) is randomly distributed with mean 0α , so εαα += 00  where ε is i.i.d. random 
error.9 This implies that:  
 
udwZXs dwzx +++++= logloglog 0* βββββ , (11) 
 
where  
 
)1/(]log[log 000 ssz ααααβ +−−= , (12) 
)1/( szz ααβ += , (12A) 
)1/( sxx ααβ +−= , (12B) 
)1/(1 sw αβ += , (12C) 
)1/( sdd ααβ +−= , (12D) 
)1/( su αε +−= . (12E) 
 
It can be easily seen that βw is the income elasticity of speed and because αs > 0, it 
follows that βw < 1. In the case where the monetary costs are a linear function of speed, 
                                                          
8 Equations (7) and (9) imply that: 
ssdx sdXwZs αααααψ loglog)1(loglog)(loglog 21*2121212102121* −−−−−+−= . 
 Hence, (10) follows. 
9 An alternative specification is that ψ is random. 
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so αs = 1, then βw = 0. In the case where the monetary costs are a convex function (αs > 
1), then 0 < βw < 0.5. Only when αs goes to infinity, so the commuters are fully 
constrained in their choice of speed, then βw = 0.10  In the case of a concave function, βw 
> 0.5. The reduced form parameters can be estimated by means of a regression of the 
logarithm of the speed level s on the logarithm of the wage w, the characteristics X and Z 
and the logarithm of commuting distance d.11 Given the reduced form estimates of βz, βx, 
βw and βd, the ‘structural’ parameters αz, αd, αs and αx are identified when Z and X do 
not include the same variables.12 Clearly: 
 
wzz ββα /= , (12F) 
wdd ββα /−= , (12G) 
wxx ββα /−= , (12H) 
ws βα /11+−= . (12I) 
 
 
The above results make sense. 13  For example, αz can be interpreted as the effect of Z on 
(the logarithm of) the value of time (see (9B)), which is proportional to the wage. Hence, 
the speed level will be optimally chosen such that αz is equal to the ratio of the marginal 
effect of Z on speed to the marginal effect of (the logarithm of) the wage on speed (see 
(12F)).14  
                                                          
10 One may argue that congestion may fully constrain car drivers when the whole trip is congested and there 
are no alternatives. For short distances, it is more likely that the whole trip is congested (e.g. in the centre of 
London), but in this case alternative modes are often available (e.g. walking, underground etc). 
11 As we will argue later on, the endogeneity of distance should be taken into account. 
12 As noted earlier, there may be cases where τ(X,s,d) should include income or the characteristics of the 
individual. However, we assume these to be of minor importance and thus omit them. Another case is when 
monetary costs include schedule delay costs so that it may be argued that the wage enters τ(X,s,d) because 
wage may affect schedule delay costs. There is some evidence that for this reason τ(X,s,d) is a negative 
function of wage w (Emmerink and Van Beek, 1997). We do not explicitly allow for that, so our estimates 
of αs may be biased upwards. 
13 For environmental characteristics (such as the urban density), it is implausible that they affect directly the 
monetary value of time, so they are not included in Z. For some individual characteristics  one may argue 
that these should be included in both Z and X, because they may influence the value of time but also the 
monetary variable costs, so for these variables the structural parameters are not identified. Suppose that the 
variable XZ is in X and Z. In this case, βxz = (αz-αx)/(1+αs). 
14 Given an estimate of β0 and an assumption on the value of αz0 (usually the value of time is thought to be 
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Given the reduced form parameters, one can easily estimate the effects of Z, X, d and w 
on the monetary costs, presuming that individuals have chosen the optimal commuting 
speed. We substitute s*(Z,X,d,w) into the marginal monetary commuting costs per 
distance τ'(X,s*,d) (see (6) and (11)), so: 
 
]loglog[2 0exp.).(),,,( udwZX dwzxwZwdXZ +++++−=′ βββββψτ , (13) 
 
and, thus, the marginal monetary costs given the optimal speed level can be written as: 
 
]log][log[2 2
1
0exp.).( udwZXm dwzxwZt
+−++++−=′ βββββψ , (14) 
 
or maybe more conveniently taking logarithms and noting that Zz wzZ
)/(
0 exp)(
ββαψ = : 
 
]log][log[2
log)/12(log'log
2
1
0
0
udwX
wZt
dwx
wzzm
+−+++−
++−+=
ββββ
ββα
 (15) 
 
so:  
 
wm wt β21log/log −=∂′∂ , (16A) 
xm Xt β2/log −=∂′∂ , (16B) 
dm dt β21log/log −=∂′∂ , (16C) 
zwm Zt ββ )/12(/log +−=∂′∂ . (16D) 
 
Hence, we are able to calculate how the optimally chosen marginal monetary costs 
                                                                                                                                                                             
around 0.5, so αz0 is around 0.5, see Small, 1992), 0α  is also identified: 
0α = -β0/βw + logαz0 - log(-1+1/βw). 
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mt ′ depend on w, Z, X and d.15 Note further that logtm = logt'm+logs*-log(αs), because tm = 
d.τ(X,d,w) = d.s*.τ'(X,d,w)/αs,16 hence: 
 
)/11log(]log]1[
log[log)/11(log 0
wd
wxzwm
ud
wXwZt
ββ
βββββ
+−−+−+
++−++−=
 (17) 
 
so: 
 
wm wt β−=∂∂ 1log/log  (18A) 
xm Xt β−=∂∂ /log  (18B) 
dm dt β−=∂∂ 1log/log  (18C) 
zwm Zt ββ )/11(/log +−=∂∂  (18D) 
 
Hence, given the reduced form estimates, we are able to identify the effects of X, Z, d 
and w on (the logarithm of) the monetary costs. For example, the reduced form estimates 
βx can be interpreted as minus the marginal effect of X on logtm (see (18B)). The 
marginal effect of Z has the same sign as βz, because –1+1/βw = αs > 0. Recall that we 
have shown that if the commuter chooses the optimal speed, then tc = αstm (see (4)), so it 
follows that t = (αs+1)tm and thus logt = log(1+αs)+logtm. Consequently, the (partial) 
effect of any exogenous variable on the logarithm of the commuting costs logt is equal to 
the (partial) effect on the logarithm of the monetary commuting costs logtm. In Table 1, 
we have summarised the effects. 
 It appears from Table 1 that the reduced form estimates (βz, βx, βw and βd) can be 
readily interpreted. For example, the effect of a variable Xi on logs can be interpreted as 
(the negative of) the effect of this variable Xi on the logarithm of the commuting costs, 
logt. The implication is, of course, that if in an area the average speed is, let’s say, 10% 
lower, e.g. due to speed restrictions which require commuters to drive 45 mph instead of 
50 mph, then the implied additional commuting costs are equal to 10% when the speed is 
                                                          
15 Recall that ∂t/∂s* = 0, so t' = 0 and t = tm+tc. So, t'm = -t'c. 
16 Because s* is optimally chosen, τ(X,d,w) = s*τ'(X,d,w)/αs. 
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optimally chosen. However if  commuters in the area with the speed restrictions of 45 
mph  drive at 50 mph, then the implied additional monetary costs are equal to αx = -
βx(1+αs) (see the last column of Table 1). Speed restrictions imply a convex monetary 
costs function (which may be presumed to be a continuous function of speed, because the 
probability of being fined is a continuous function of speed), so αs > 1, so αx is at least 
twice βx. For example, when αs = 5, the implied monetary costs of driving 55 mph would 
be 50% higher than when driving 50 mph. 
 In the third column, the effect of characteristics on the marginal commuting costs 
with respect to speed can be found. The interesting hypotheses here are whether 1-2βw = 
0, so βw = 0.5, and whether 1-2βd = 0, so βd = 0.5. In the case that βw = 0.5, the 
implication is that the wage has no effect on the marginal monetary costs. Similarly, if βd 
= 0.5, then the distance has no effect on the marginal monetary costs.    
 
3. Empirical results 
 
3.1 The data 
The empirical analysis involves estimating equation (11). This requires information on 
commuting speed, commuting time, the wage rate and other variables that influence 
choice of travel speed, preferably on the individual level. We use data from National 
Travel Surveys (NTS) for Great Britain. The NTS is based on a 7-day travel diary for a 
sample of private households and includes information on distance, time, purpose and 
mode for all trips made by each household member. It also includes data on a large 
number of socio-economic and demographic characteristics relating to the individuals 
and households. 
Our analysis employs data for the six years 1989-1991 and 1999-2001. Using data 
for three consecutive years insures that the sample is representative of the British 
population and the two 3-year periods increases the variation in the variables, as well as 
providing the possibility of examining changes in behaviour over time. The analysis is 
based on individuals who report work trips by all modes on a given day17. Thus all stages 
of the commuting journey, both to and from work, are included in the measures of 
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commuting time, distance and speed. In our sample, the average commuting time per 
working day is 43 minutes (s.d. = 34), the average commuting distance is 15 miles (s.d. = 
19) and the average commuting speed is 18 miles per hour (s.d. = 12).18  
A most important explanatory variable in our model is the wage rate. Information 
on the hourly wage is not collected in the NTS, so the annual income of the individual is 
used instead.19 Other explanatory variables included in the model relate to characteristics 
of the individual, the household to which they belong and the area in which they live. 
Characteristics of the individual are gender, age, whether they are full- or part-time 
employed and whether they are employed or self-employed. The characteristics of the 
household include the number of adults in the household and whether or not there are 
children in the household. The location variables are the population density and the 
population of municipality where the individual resides. Apart from income and distance, 
all explanatory variables are binary variables equal to 1 if the condition holds and zero 
otherwise. The estimation thus requires one variable in each group to be omitted and the 
coefficients of the remaining variables are interpreted in relation to the reference group. 
A dummy variable equal to one for the 1999-2001 data and zero fore the 1989-1991 data 
is also included to allow for a difference in intercept over the 10-year period.20 
 
3.2 The estimation procedure 
In the theoretical analysis, it is assumed that the commuting distance is exogenously 
given. This assumption is unlikely to hold in the data we analyse. For example, it may be 
the case that some individuals may have a preference for a faster (or slower) travel mode 
(e.g. the car) for reasons unrelated to speed (e.g. convenience) and are therefore more 
likely to commute faster (or slower) than other individuals. Given higher speed levels, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
17 Diary day 7 is chosen because walk trips of less than 1 mile are not included on the other days.  
18 The coefficient of variation (the standard deviation divided by the mean) for speed equals 0.66, for time 
equals 0.79 and for distance equals 1.26. Hence, the variation in the chosen speed level is relatively small 
compared to commuting time and particularly distance. This makes sense as those with a long commuting 
distance travel at higher speeds explaining why the coefficient of variation of time is less than the 
coefficient of distance. It follows from (6) that given an average distance of 15 miles and a speed level of 
18 MPH, t'm = ψw.0.05. 
19 Income is given in 20 income groups in the NTS. The individual’s income is taken as the mid-point of 
the group, converted to year 2000 prices using the retail price index. 
20 The variables speed, income and distance enter the model in logarithmic form so that the coefficients 
relating to income and distance are in elasticity form, which are constant by this specification. 
 14
these individuals are more likely to accept longer distances a priori. A similar problem 
occurs when some individuals are more restricted in maximum speed levels than others. 
Individuals face different degrees of physical and legal constraints which affect the 
maximum costs of speed (e.g. congestion, maximum speed restrictions).21 If individuals 
are constrained at different levels, then it means that those who are able to travel at higher 
speeds without exceeding the maximum speed restriction may accept jobs at longer 
distances ceteris paribus. Further, it is difficult in the empirical analysis to control fully 
for the variation in the spatial environment (e.g. supply of public transport, congestion, 
motorway accessibility etc) which may cause the commuting distance to become 
endogenous. If commuting distance is endogenous, it will be correlated with the error 
term so that the OLS estimates of (11) will not be consistent. Consistent estimates can be 
obtained by using an instrumental variables (IV) estimation procedure. As an instrument 
for commuting distance, we use the skill level of the job. The skill level should not 
influence the optimal speed conditional on income, but will influence the density of 
acceptable jobs and therefore the commuting distance. It is generally true that jobs 
involving higher skill levels are more specialised and therefore less common, implying 
longer commuting distances (Rouwendal and Rietveld, 1994). 
 
3.3 The reduced form estimates of speed 
Both OLS and IV estimates are presented in Table 2, along with goodness-of-fit and test 
statistics.22 The Hausman Test for the exogeneity of the distance variable, shown at the 
bottom of the table, is 2.398, so that exogeneity cannot be rejected at the 0.10 probability 
level. This implies that OLS provides consistent estimates (although the power of the test 
may not be high). The estimated parameters are very similar for both models, and in most 
cases are not statistically different from each other. In general, the reduced form 
estimated coefficients are in accordance with the literature on transport mode choice 
(Madan and Groenhout, 1987; Jara Diaz and Videla, 1989; Asensio, 2002).23 The income 
                                                          
21 Note that maximum speed restrictions are, from an economic point of view, not an absolute constraint, 
since people can, and do, exceed maximum speed levels at the risk of paying a fine (Gander, 1985). The 
point is however that some individuals face different maximum speed restrictions. 
22 A number of other models were estimated, which confirm the robustness of the results. 
23 The reduced form estimates are broadly consistent with those of Fosgerau (2004), who analyses the 
speed of car drivers who also travel for different purposes other than commuting, arguing a positive 
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elasticity of speed is estimated as 0.088 (OLS) and 0.126 (IV) and the elasticity of speed 
with respect to distance as 0.492 (OLS) and 0.403 (IV). Statistically, there is little 
difference between the estimates.  
The characteristics of residential location are shown to be highly significant with 
both estimation procedures. Commuting speed declines as population density increases, 
and also declines as the population of the municipality increases. Both of these reflect the 
higher congestion in built up areas and the availability and more prevalent use of public 
transport. Regarding the other variables, we find that commuting speed is lower for 
women and for the over 65s. The part-time employed and the self-employed appear to 
travel at higher speeds than the full-time employed according to the OLS estimates, but 
the IV estimates indicate that this effect is spurious. Individuals who are the sole adult in 
the household travel slower than those in households with 2 or more adults. Those with 
children appear to travel faster, but not significantly so. The results show further that 
commuting speed has not increased over the decade, ceteris paribus. 
 
4. The structural parameters and the effect on the commuting costs 
 
Given the reduced form estimates, we are able to calculate the structural parameters αs, 
αd, αz and αx (see Table 3). We will discuss the IV estimates in more detail, but note that 
the OLS estimates tend to give somewhat higher values, because the point estimate of βw 
is somewhat smaller. We have seen that βw = 0.126 (s.e. = 0.026), it appears therefore 
that the speed elasticity of monetary costs αs = 6.94  (s.e. = 1.40, see equation (12H)), so 
αs > 1.  The main consequence is that the monetary costs are a convex function of speed. 
Because αs is quite large, the marginal cost of commuting is extremely high at higher 
speed levels. We believe this makes sense. At certain higher levels of speed, commuters 
are essentially constrained due to speed limits and the increased risk of an accident. The 
estimates also imply that at low speed levels, the marginal costs are close to zero. This 
also makes sense.  For example, the additional monetary costs of switching from walking 
to the use of a bicycle (which increases the speed level by a factor four) are modest.  
                                                                                                                                                                             
relationship between speed and income due to the presence of speed limit fines. In this study for Denmark, 
the income elasticity is smaller than we find (about 0.02 to 0.03) and the distance elasticity is about 0.20. 
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Recall that by choosing an optimal speed level, the ratio of variable monetary 
costs to time costs is equal to αs-1. It follows that the ratio of variable monetary costs to 
time costs is equal to 0.144 (s.e. = 0.061). Such a result is consistent with the mode 
choice literature where it is found that exogenous travel time changes in transport modes 
are seen as a more relevant factor than monetary costs (e.g. Madan and Groenhout, 1987; 
Asensio, 2002). 
Recall that the parameter αd is the distance elasticity of the monetary costs per 
distance. The results imply that αd is negative and is equal to -3.14 (s.e. = 0.69)24, see 
equation (12F). Hence at longer distances, the marginal monetary costs are substantially 
lower, which is consistent with the observation that commuters at longer distances travel 
much faster (as we have argued before, the fixed monetary costs will probably increase 
with distance, so αd+1, the distance elasticity of the variable monetary costs may be 
negative). One may argue that it is more insightful to focus on the effect of distance on 
the (variable) commuting costs given the optimal speed level. Employing (18C), it 
appears that the distance elasticity of the commuting costs is about 0.6 (see Table 3). It 
appears however (see (16C)) that the distance elasticity of the marginal monetary 
commuting costs is 0.194 (s.e. = 0.118), which is statistically not different from zero at 
the 5% significance level (of course, the marginal total commuting costs are zero by 
assumption). Consequently, the effect of speed on the monetary costs does not depend on 
distance, when the speed is optimally chosen. 
The parameter αx measures the effect of background characteristics on (the 
logarithm of) the monetary commuting costs. For example, it follows (using (8) and 
(12H)) that in London the implied (marginal) monetary costs are much higher. Ceteris 
paribus (so given the same arbitrarily chosen speed level), the (marginal) monetary costs 
are about 13 times higher (exp (2.571) = 13) than in small cities. One may again argue 
however that it is less insightful to focus on the effect of X given arbitrarily chosen speed 
levels, because the optimally chosen speed level is different in London than elsewhere. 
Equation (16B) shows that in London (compared to municipalities with a size between 3 
and 100k inhabitants and given the lower optimally chosen speed level) the marginal 
monetary costs are ‘only’ about 2 times higher (exp(0.648) = 2.07), whereas the monetary 
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costs are ‘only’ 1.51 times higher (exp(0.324) = 1.51, employing (18A)). Hence, we 
interpret the results as follows. Given the same speed level, the (marginal) monetary costs 
are much higher in London than elsewhere.  Subsequently, the commuters choose lower 
speed levels in London than elsewhere to decrease the marginal monetary costs.  Still, in 
the optimum, the marginal monetary costs are higher in London, since the marginal 
benefits are decreasing in speed, so the marginal benefits are higher in London. One of 
the consequences is that the implied variable monetary costs are about 50% higher in 
London given the chosen speed level. 
The parameter αz measures the effect of Z on (the logarithm of) the value of time 
ψ(Z). It follows that the value of time of women is about 40% less (exp(-0.508)-1 = -
0.40) than for men, ceteris paribus, but other individual characteristics have no 
statistically significant effect. Note that because the speed elasticity of the monetary costs 
αs is large (i.e., the monetary costs are a convex function of speed), a relatively small 
value for βz has a large effect on αz (for women, βz is -0.064, see Table 2). This implies 
that relatively large differences in the value of time between individuals have little effect 
on the chosen speed level. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we have estimated a structural model of optimal speed choice, which can be 
derived from a reduced form regression of speed on income and distance. The model has 
been applied to the UK for the year 1989 to 1991 and 1999 to 2001. Our estimates imply 
that the elasticity of speed with respect to income is 0.126 and that the total travel costs 
mainly consist of time costs. For the average commuter, the variable monetary costs are 
about 14% of the total variable costs. We find that the monetary costs of speed are a 
convex function of speed: at high levels of speed, monetary costs increase strongly (e.g. 
due to the increased risk of accidents, fines etc), so the marginal costs become essentially 
infinite. Our results imply that differences in the value of time between individuals have 
little effect on the chosen speed level. Finally, it appears that the (marginal) monetary 
costs of speed are a positive function of the population density and municipality size, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
24 The standard error is calculated using the delta method, see Goldberger (1991). 
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ceteris paribus. For example, in London, the variable monetary costs of speed are about 
13 times as large than in small cities, ceteris paribus. Nevertheless, given the optimally 
chosen speed level, which is much lower in London due to speed restrictions and 
congestion which increases the risk of accidents (Verhoef and Rouwendal, 2001), the 
variable marginal costs are ‘only’ 50% larger.  
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FIGURE 1. Commuting costs as a function of speed (when the monetary costs  
are a linear function of speed). 
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Table 1. Comparative statics: marginal effects 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 logs logt logt'm logtm|s logtc|s 
Z βz (-1+1/βw)βz (-2+1/βw)βz - αz 
X βx -βx -2βx αx - 
logw βw 1-βw 1-2βw - 1 
logd βd 1-βd 1-2βd αd 1 
Notes: logt'm = ∂logtm/∂s; log t and logtm' are determined given the optimally chosen speed level. In the last 
two columns, the effect is reported on the monetary and time costs conditional on the speed level. When the 
X and Z variables are discrete dummy variables, then the effect of a variable with effect of let’s say γ is 
equal to expγ-1, which is approximately equal to γ when γ is small. 
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Table 2. Parameter estimates and statistical tests. Dependent variable = Log Speed 
 
 OLS Estimation IV Estimation 
 Coefficient S.E. Prob. Coefficient S.E. Prob. Mean
        
Constant 0.396 0.030 0.000 0.702 0.204 0.001 0.00
βw 
Log Income 0.088 0.008 0.000 0.126 0.026 0.000 2.51
βd 
Log Distance 0.492 0.004 0.000 0.403 0.059 0.000 4.31
βz 
Woman -0.047 0.011 0.000 -0.064 0.016 0.000 0.42
Age 18 – 34 years 0.002 0.010 0.826 0.014 0.013 0.275 0.39
Age > 65 years  -0.071 0.040 0.078 -0.071 0.041 0.084 0.02
Part-time Employed 0.037 0.017 0.029 0.010 0.024 0.666 0.15
Self-employed 0.042 0.025 0.095 0.026 0.028 0.358 0.04
1 Adult in household -0.054 0.017 0.001 -0.077 0.023 0.001 0.10
3+ Adults in household -0.007 0.015 0.651 -0.010 0.016 0.527 0.12
Children in household 0.018 0.010 0.091 0.013 0.011 0.244 0.37
βx 
Population density 
< 1 persons/hectare 0.072 0.020 0.000 0.068 0.020 0.001 0.10
15 - 39.9 persons/hectare -0.039 0.013 0.003 -0.054 0.016 0.001 0.35
40 + persons/hectare -0.141 0.016 0.000 -0.162 0.021 0.000 0.24
Municipality size 
London  -0.328 0.018 0.000 -0.324 0.019 0.000 0.12
Other Metro Areas -0.085 0.016 0.000 -0.091 0.017 0.000 0.14
Cities over 100 k -0.051 0.014 0.000 -0.058 0.015 0.000 0.23
Villages under 3 k 0.068 0.020 0.001 0.092 0.026 0.000 0.09
Dummy 1999-2001 -0.006 0.011 0.596 0.006 0.013 0.675 0.34
     
Observations. 9361       9361   
Adjusted R2 0.671      0.655   
F[18,9345]  1060.7  Prob = 0.000     988.7  Prob =  0.000  
Akaike Criterion  1.320      1.365   
Hausman test F-statistic        2.398  Prob =  0.122  
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Table 3. Structural parameters and effects of variables on commuting costs  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Commuting costs Monetary costs Value of time 
 Estimate s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. 
   αs    
Speed   6.944 1.401   
       
Log Income 0.874 0.026     
   αd    
Log Distance 0.597 0.059 -3.141 0.691   
     αz  
Woman -0.444 0.222   -0.508 0.254 
Age 18 – 34 years 0.097 0.090   0.111 0.103 
Age > 65 years  -0.492 0.284   -0.563 0.325 
Part-time Employed 0.069 0.166   0.079 0.190 
Self-employed 0.180 0.194   0.206 0.222 
1 Adult in household -0.534 0.319   -0.611 0.365 
3+ Adults in household -0.069 0.111   -0.079 0.127 
Children in household 0.090 0.076   0.103 0.087 
       
Population density   αx    
< 1 persons/hectare -0.068 0.020 -0.540 0.159   
0.016 15 - 39.9 
persons/hectare  
0.429 0.127 0.054  
 
40 + persons/hectare 0.162 0.021 1.286 0.167   
Municipality size       
London  0.324 0.019 2.571 0.151   
Other Metro Areas 0.091 0.017 0.722 0.135   
Cities over 100 k 0.058 0.015 0.460 0.119   
Villages under 3 k -0.092 0.026 -0.730 0.206   
Dummy 1999-2001 -0.006 0.013 -0.048 0.103   
   
Note: In column (1), the (marginal) effects on the logarithm of the (variable) commuting costs (given the 
optimal speed level) are reported, using Table 1, column 2. Columns (2) and (3) report the structural 
parameters which can be interpreted as the (marginal) effects on the logarithm of the (variable) monetary 
commuting costs and value of time respectively. 
 
